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Abstract 
 
 
The large and growing US current account deficit has its counterpart in the large and 
growing current account surpluses in Asia and in the major oil-exporting countries.  
Although Europe is not part of the problem of global imbalances, Europeans are 
concerned that a disproportionately large burden of adjustment will fall on Europe. 
Without more exchange rate flexibility in Asia, adjustment may involve excessive 
appreciation of European currencies. The euro-area economy is not flexible enough to 
cope easily with a substantial euro appreciation, which would depress already 
sluggish growth and exacerbate divergences within the euro area. If EU institutions do 
not deliver in the face of a sharp appreciation in the euro, Europe’s responses could be 
more erratic, and there would be a greater risk of a more protectionist response. 
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1. Introduction  
  Global current account imbalances have widened markedly in recent years 
amid a configuration of robust growth, fiscal deficits, and low personal saving rates in 
the United States, sluggish growth in Europe, high savings rates and export-led 
growth in Asia, and elevated oil prices that have boosted the coffers of oil-exporting 
countries.    
This paper explores the issue of global current account imbalances from the 
perspective of European countries.  We have divided the paper into six sections. After 
this brief introduction, we discuss the role that Europe has played in the development 
of global imbalances. Data on current account balances suggest that Europe is not part 
of the problem of global imbalances. From Europe’s point of view, the optimal global 
rebalancing scenario is one in which Europe imports more US-produced goods and 
services and exports more goods and services to Asia and the oil-exporting countries, 
leaving Europe’s current account largely unaffected even as the US current account 
deficit shrinks. However, this outcome presupposes a decline in the Asian current 
account surplus, which likely will require appreciation of Asian currencies. Europeans 
fear an alternative rebalancing scenario in which Europe imports more from the US 
and exports less to Asia or imports more from Asia, allowing the US current account 
deficit to decline while the Asian surpluses remain the same. This undesirable 
outcome for Europe is most likely to result if Asian currencies remain pegged to the 
dollar, which in the event of a drop in the dollar, could lead to an excessive real 
appreciation of the euro. 
  In the next section, we explore the consequences of a substantial real 
exchange rate appreciation for Europe. We highlight several reasons why an excessive 
  2appreciation of European currencies would be a serious concern in Europe, including 
the depressing effects on European economic growth, the inability of some European 
economies to adjust smoothly and promptly to an exchange rate shock, and the effects 
on divergences within the euro area. This section also includes a discussion of the 
implications for Europe of changes in exchange rate regimes in Asia.  
We next discuss the roles that European institutions might play during global 
current account adjustment. If a sharp adjustment in exchange rates were to occur that 
threatened to result in deflationary pressures in the euro area, the ECB would be 
expected to loosen monetary policy promptly and aggressively. The jury is still out, 
however, on the ECB’s deflation-fighting zeal. We also highlight how Europe’s 
Stability and Growth Pact may hinder a prompt response of fiscal policy to a rapid 
adjustment. In addition, we explore the possibility of European intervention in foreign 
exchange markets as a response to an excessive appreciation in the euro. 
European attitudes and policies vis-à-vis Asia are examined in the next section. 
The large US current account deficit and large Chinese current account surplus raises 
a question about what is driving this China-US imbalance. One view puts the blame 
on US excess demand while another view points to excess savings in China. 
Depending on which one it is, reducing that imbalance has different consequences for 
relations between China and the euro area. We close with a summary of the paper and 
some recommendations for policy.  
 
2. Europe’s contribution to global imbalances  
Data on the evolution of external balances, shown in Table 1, suggest that 
Europe contributes very little to current global imbalances.  The counterpart of the 
large and growing U.S. current account deficit are the large and growing current 
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decade, the nearly $700 billion increase in the US current account deficit was 
accompanied by a roughly $330 billion increase in Asia’s surplus and a $360 
increase--most of which happened since 2002--in the oil-exporters’ surplus. For 2005, 
the US current account deficit of nearly $800 billion is almost entirely accounted for 
by Asia’s roughly $400 surplus and the $375 billion surplus of the oil-exporting 
countries.  
In contrast, the euro area’s current account (measured in a way that corrects 
for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions) swung into deficit last year, 
following 3 years of moderate surpluses. The UK current account deficit continued to 
widen, reaching $58 billion (about 2½ percent of GDP) last year.  One reading of 
these data is that Europe is not part of the problem of global imbalances. This is not 
withstanding the fact that some euro-area countries have sizable current account 
imbalances: Germany, for example, has recorded annual surpluses of around        
$100 billion in recent years. As an aggregate, however, the euro area seems to be 
financially largely self-contained. Taking the EU as an aggregate, this tendency is 
even stronger. This suggests that the eventual rebalancing of current accounts should 
primarily involve the US, Asia, and the oil-exporting countries. 
The whopping current account surpluses registered in oil-exporting countries 
in recent years highlight an interesting consequence of the ongoing elevated level of 
world oil prices for global imbalances: High oil prices have shifted some of the rest of 
the world’s (that is, non-US) current account surplus away from Asia towards net oil 
exporters. To the extent that the oil-exporting countries have lower propensities to 
save than economies in Asia, this shift may bring about a faster decline in savings in 
the rest of the world. That said, Asian economies also have higher investment rates 
  4than those in oil-exporting countries. Therefore, it is not clear whether the shift in 
surpluses from Asia towards oil exporters will slow or speed up current account 
adjustment. Moreover, because oil-exporting countries have lower savings and 
investment rates than economies in Asia, recent developments imply a shift in global 
demand away from investment goods and towards consumption goods. This might 
well benefit US exports (which are more heavily concentrated in consumer goods and 
services) at the expense of German exports (for which capital goods are more 
important). 
Underlying Europe’s current account deficit for 2005 were the bilateral trade 
balances reported in Table 2.  Europe’s trade surplus with regards to the US of nearly 
$100 billion last year was similar in magnitude to the trade surpluses of both Japan 
and the oil-exporting countries against the US, and roughly half the size of China’s 
surplus with the US.  Like the US, Europe recorded large bilateral trade deficits vis-à-
vis China, Japan, and the oil-exporting countries.  Although the configuration of 
bilateral trade positions reflects many factors, one can imagine a global rebalancing 
scenario in which Europe imports more US-produced goods and services and exports 
more goods and services to Asia and the oil-exporting countries. This would leave 
Europe’s current account largely unaffected even as the US current account deficit 
shrinks, but it presupposes a decline in the Asian current account surplus. The 
alternative rebalancing scenario is one in which Europe imports more from the US 
and exports less to Asia or imports more from Asia, allowing the US current account 
deficit to decline while the Asian surpluses remain the same.  
The financial counterpart to the large current account imbalances are the large 
imbalances in net international financial flows. Another perspective on global 
  5imbalances can be gained from exploring what role Europe has played in generating 
the observed patterns in financial flows.  
Table 3 shows data on the composition of US capital flows over recent years. 
A striking feature of recent capital flows has been the substantial rise in official net 
capital flows since 2001.  These net inflows peaked in 2004 as the authorities in Asia 
intervened heavily in foreign exchange markets in an effort to restrain the 
appreciation of their currencies, before moderating some last year.
1 The step-down in 
net official inflows in 2005 compared with the previous year, as well as the sharp 
increase in net private inflows, meant that the bulk of the overall net inflows needed 
to finance the US current account deficit last year was accounted for by net private 
capital inflows. By contrast, in both 2003 and 2004, net official inflows were the 
predominate source of financing, accounting for 60 per cent of total net inflows in 
2003 and 65 per cent in 2004. Most of these flows came from Asia; Europe is not part 
of the official flows story. 
Interestingly, Feldstein (2006) argues that in reality foreign governments 
continue to provide the overwhelmingly share of financing for the US current account 
deficit, and that a substantial chunk of inflows that are classified as “private” in the 
balance-of-payment data are purchases of US securities by private institutions acting 
on behalf of foreign governments. Whatever the truth, there is little doubt that official 
inflows have become a significant source of financing for the US current account 
deficit. 
The rise in net private inflows last year in part reflected the continued 
recovery in the demand for claims on the US private sector from their recent lows in 
                                                 
1 The Japanese Ministry of Finance reported record levels of foreign exchange market intervention 
during 2003 and 2004, with total intervention amounting to the equivalent of $183 billion in 2003 and 
$136 billion in the first quarter of 2004.  No official intervention by the Japanese authorities has been 
reported since the first quarter of 2004.  
  62003. Private foreign purchases of US securities (excluding US Treasury securities) 
jumped last year, largely reflected a marked increase in private foreign purchases of 
US corporate bonds, though purchases of US equities and US agency bonds also rose. 
Figure 1 confirms the findings in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) that foreign 
purchases of US debt (including corporate bonds, agency bonds, and Treasuries) have 
become an increasingly important source of financing of the US current account 
deficit in recent years relative to purchases of portfolio equities and direct investments. 
Private foreign purchases of US Treasury securities also rose last year. Table 4 
shows that the increase in purchases in 2005 was broad-based across foreign regions.
2 
The largest private purchasers of US Treasury securities last year were from Europe, 
followed by the Caribbean financial centers (perhaps partly reflecting purchases by 
the oil-exporting countries) and Asia. 
In addition, although private foreign direct investment in the US declined    
$23 billion last year relative to 2004 (see Table 3), US direct investment abroad 
plummeted from $244 billion to $9 billion as foreign subsidiaries of US multinational 
corporations repatriated large amounts of funds back to the US in response to 
incentives associated with the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, that expired for 
most companies at year-end 2005.   
Europe’s contribution to capital inflows into the US is summarized is Table 5. 
US capital inflows from Europe peaked at nearly $600 billion in 2000 in the midst of 
the US high-tech bubble. The pace of inflows from Europe slowed sharply over the 
next two years, but recovered in 2004 and 2005 to more than a $450 billion annual 
rate.  
                                                 
2 The aggregate figure for private foreign purchases of US Treasury securities in Table 4 of $215 
billion differs from the $200 billion figure reported in Table 3 because the former excludes not just 
central banks and finance ministries but transactions of all foreign official agencies. 
  7This recovery was driven in large part by increases in European purchases of 
US private securities, which were especially large in 2005 at $220 billion. As shown 
in Table 6, UK purchases of US corporate bonds ballooned in 2005 to $140 billion 
from about one-half of that amount in 2004. In contrast, inflows of direct investment 
from Europe (see Table 5), which tanked in 2001 from the rapid pace of the late 
1990s and 2000, has remained subdued at about a $65 billion annual pace. 
 
Is there “Dark Matter” in European-US investment? 
It is well known that although the US has had a large negative net international 
investment position (NIIP) for many years, US income receipts have been larger than 
income payments.
3 At end-2005, for example, the US NIIP stood at -$2.7 trillion 
(about 25 per cent of US GDP), while income receipts at $474 billion outpaced 
payments of $463 billion for the year as a whole.
4 Recently, Hausmann and 
Sturzenegger (2005) generated quite a bit of controversy by attributing the positive 
net income flow to so-called “dark matter” in the balance-of-payments statistics.
5 
Their claim is that US direct investment abroad contains intangible assets that are not 
measured in the statistics. As a result, US FDI abroad is undervalued.  
Table 7 sheds some light on the question of “dark matter” from the perspective 
of Europe. Over recent years, US income payments to the EU have slightly exceeded 
US income receipts, typically to the tune of about $8 billion. However, US income 
receipts on direct investment in the EU has exceeded US income payments to EU 
direct investment in the US. The difference between US receipts and payments on its 
FDI position vis-à-vis Europe rose from $16 billion in 1999 to around $32½ billion in 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Cline (2005). 
4 US income payments actually exceeded receipts in the fourth quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 
2006, in part reflecting the higher interest payments on US bonds and notes as a result of rising US 
interest rates. 
5 Buiter (2006), for one, is not convinced. 
  82001 and 2002, before easing back to about $13 billion in 2005. This difference 
between receipts and payments persisted despite the fact that the stock of US direct 
investment in Europe was less than or only slightly exceeded the stock of European 
direct investment in the US. Whatever the source of “dark matter” in recorded US 
income flows, Europe appears to be part of the story. 
 
How will the burden of adjustment be shared? 
The net financial inflows to the US described above add to US net external 
liabilities. As discussed in Ahearne and von Hagen (2005), the trend of rising US net 
external liabilities relative to GDP cannot continue forever. A continuously rising 
ratio of net external liabilities to GDP would eventually see the burden of servicing 
these liabilities becoming unbearably large. At some stage, the ratio of net external 
liabilities to GDP must stabilise, which requires that the US trade deficit eventually 
narrow to near zero. The adjustment will almost certainly involve a significant real 
depreciation in the real effective exchange rate of the dollar (a weighted average of 
bilateral real exchange rates). Given that the responsiveness of US exports and 
imports to changes in the real effective exchange rate is relatively small, substantial 
real dollar depreciation, perhaps in the range 20-40 per cent, will be required to shrink 
the US trade deficit.
6
When the real effective exchange rate of the dollar depreciates, the key factor 
determining how the burden of adjustment is shared across countries will be 
movements in bilateral exchange rates. Europeans are afraid of an unfair distribution 
of the adjustment burden because their exchange rates are the only flexible things 
around. Figure 2 shows that the bilateral dollar-euro and dollar-sterling nominal 
                                                 
6 Estimates of the amount of dollar depreciation that may be required to bring about adjustment are 
from Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004). 
  9exchange rates have moved much more over recent years that the US nominal 
effective exchange rate, suggesting that a large amount of the effective dollar 
depreciation since 2002 has been borne by Europe. Unless something changes, 
Europeans are fearful that this unequal distribution of adjustment will continue.  
Figures 3-5 help us to think about the implications of some of these issues by 
offering a longer-term perceptive on current account balances in the major regions. 
Figure 3 shows current balances since 1980, which allows us to compare the current 
imbalances with the past. Figure 4 reports the cumulated current account imbalances 
over time. It shows how much US assets each region has accumulated. Figure 5 shows 
the cumulated current account of each region as a percentage of the cumulated US 
current account. It shows the share of dollar assets that each region had acquired up to 
that point. A negative number means that a region is a net acquirer of dollar assets. 
A first, consistent message from these graphs is that the EU has been largely a 
self-financing region over the past 25 years. Current account imbalances have never 
been very large. For Europe to shoulder a major part of the new adjustment would be 
an unprecedented experience. To put it differently: Europeans have never accepted 
large changes in Europe’s current account position to allow global adjustment. The 
only exception is the brief period between 1986 and 1988, when Europe tolerated a 
moderate shrinking in its current account surplus, coinciding with the period in which 
international coordination worked (i.e., over the period from the Plaza to the Louvre 
agreements). 
A second, interesting part of the message is the stark difference between the 
1980s imbalances and today's. In the 1980s, Japan contributed most of the adjustment 
and acquired most of the dollar assets. In recent years, the adjustment has been shared 
more equally among the Asian economies. In contrast to the 1980s, there is now a 
  10coordination problem on the Asian side. That is, in the 1980s, any externality from the 
adjustment (the fact that stopping support for the dollar would have consequences for 
the home-currency value of the previously accumulated dollar assets) was internalized 
by Japan. This is no longer the case. This may be one reason why developing Asia 
and Japan seem to go in different directions since 2004, with an increasing share of 
the action being official interventions: As Japan slows its support for the dollar, 
developing Asia increases its support in fear of a falling value of the dollar.  
This is interesting from a European perspective. In the 1980s, the Europeans 
were dragged into the Plaza Agreement (against opposition, especially from the 
Bundesbank) because the US and Japan were able to reach an agreement. Now the 
situation is different: It would take the US and many Asian economies to coordinate 
before Europe could be coerced into a similar exercise. 
Continuing the same logic suggests that Europe has little interest in promoting 
international coordination with the Asian economies and the US. Europe would prefer 
to hide behind the argument that the ECB is independent and cannot be forced to 
cooperate. 
 
3. Consequences of real exchange rate appreciation for Europe 
There are several reasons why an excessive appreciation of European 
currencies would be a serious cause for concern in Europe. For starters, 
notwithstanding recent indicators suggesting a nascent recovery in the euro area may 
be underway, economic growth in the euro area remains sluggish.  A 
disproportionately large real appreciation of the euro that depresses euro-area net 
exports could snuff out any prospect of a long-awaited improvement in economic 
performance. Second, euro-area markets for labour and products are not sufficiently 
  11flexible to facilitate the smooth reallocation of resources across sectors that would be 
required to keep unemployment from rising in the event of a large euro appreciation. 
Finally, a significant appreciation in the euro would have asymmetric effects on 
individual euro-area members and would add to already sizable divergences in 
economic performance across the euro area. We now discuss each of these reasons in 
more detail. 
Economic growth in the euro area has been very disappointing for a long time, 
dragged down by dismal real GDP growth in some of the larger EMU countries such 
as Germany and Italy. Recent indicators on activity have been more positive, but it is 
not clear whether the recent pick-up in growth in domestic demand can be sustained.  
As a result, a sharp appreciation in the real exchange value of the euro that would 
depress net exports carries with it the risk of deflationary pressures and a severe 
recession in the euro area. Adjustment could be very painful if accompanied by higher 
euro-area inflation since this would rule out monetary easing by the ECB. In this 
regard, one concern is that the recently elevated rates of growth in euro-area monetary 
aggregates may lead to a pick-up in inflation in the next year or two, possibly at the 
same time that the euro is appreciating.  
Moreover, as holders of large amounts of dollar assets, a sharp appreciation in 
the euro versus the dollar might also have a depressing effect on domestic demand in 
the euro area as a result of negative wealth effects. As shown in Table 8, the euro 
area’s holdings of gross dollar assets at the end of 2004 amounted to nearly $3,000 
billion, equivalent to about one-third of euro area GDP. Depreciation in the dollar of 
30 per cent against the euro would imply a loss of wealth for the euro area equal to 
nearly 10 per cent of euro area GDP. This is a large number, although given 
uncertainties about the true size of wealth effects in Europe, it is an open question as 
  12to how large the effect on domestic demand would be of a loss of wealth of this 
magnitude.
7  
These numbers assume an orderly adjustment. The wealth effects of a 
disorderly correction would be even greater. Such a scenario would not only involve 
an abrupt drop in the dollar, but would also see surging US interest rates, falling US 
stock prices, and weaker economic activity in the United States. The effects would 
probably spill over into financial markets in other countries, dragging down asset 
prices in Europe and elsewhere. 
A second major concern is that markets in Europe are not sufficiently flexible 
to facilitate the smooth reallocation of resources that real exchange rate adjustment 
would necessitate. Ahearne and von Hagen (2005) present estimates of the possible 
effect on Europe’s already high unemployment rate based on a scenario where the 
burden of adjustment is shared equally between Europe, Asia and the oil-exporting 
countries.  In that example, adjustment would result in more than 3 million job losses 
in Europe’s traded goods sector. If these displaced workers were not able to find new 
jobs in the non-traded sector, the average EU-15 unemployment rate would jump to 9 
per cent from 7.5 per cent today, increasing the fiscal burden of unemployment 
accordingly. 
To keep unemployment from rising, significant resources would need to shift 
from the traded goods sector to the non-traded sector. It is not clear that European 
markets are flexible enough to engineer such a large reallocation, especially if 
adjustment occurs over a short period of time. To be sure, the US has successfully 
moved factors from its traded goods sector to its non-traded sector to keep the US 
economy close to full employment as the trade deficit has swelled. However, US 
                                                 
7 We note that the euro depreciated about 40 per cent against the dollar between 1999 and 2002, and 
then appreciated about 50 per cent afterwards with no apparent wealth effects, perhaps suggesting that 
wealth effects in the euro area are small. 
  13markets are generally regarded as more flexible than European markets, and the 
reallocation in the US has taken place gradually over a decade. 
A third reason why an excessive appreciation of the euro would be a serious 
concern for Europeans is that it could exacerbate the problem of economic 
divergences in growth and inflation between existing EMU members (for a discussion 
of divergences in the euro area, see Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry, 2006). A sharp 
appreciation in the euro would represent a common shock to countries in the euro area, 
but one that would probably have asymmetric effects on individual euro-area 
members. These asymmetric effects would complicate the response of policy to the 
rise in the euro, especially the response of the euro area’s one-size-fits-all monetary 
policy. These effects could be alleviated, however, by a shift in demand towards the 
oil exporting countries, if these countries buy primarily investment goods in Europe. 
In that case, a large share of the extra demand would fall on Germany and help the 
adjustment. 
Appreciation in the euro would probably have asymmetric effects on 
individual countries in the euro area for several reasons. First, as shown in Table 9, 
the importance of trade with the United States varies considerably across euro-area 
countries. Exports to the US in 2005 represented less than 1 per cent of GDP in 
Greece and Spain. At the opposite end of the scale is Ireland, where exports to the US 
accounted for a whopping 10 per cent of GDP last year. Ireland also imported a 
relative large share from the United States, along with other countries such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands. In contrast, imports from the US were relatively small 
for Finland, Spain and Portugal. As a result, the size of the effect of movements in the 
euro on individual countries’ real effective (trade-weighted) exchange varies 
  14considerably.
8 In addition, some industries would be affected more than others by 
euro appreciation, so differences in industrial structure and the composition of trade 
with the US will cause asymmetric effects.  
More generally, in the context of a Chinese currency pegged to the dollar, the 
relevant trading partner is not just the United States, but the wider “dollar zone” of 
countries whose currencies would depreciate along with the dollar. All euro-area 
members have seen their imports from China rise markedly since the launch of EMU, 
with Belgium and the Netherlands importing the most from China.  
As well as different trading patterns, asymmetric effects of a sharp 
appreciation may arise because of differences across euro area members in trade 
elasticities, initial conditions, investment patterns, and flexibility. 
 
Implications for Europe of exchange rate regime change in Asia 
Currency regimes in Asia continue to receive a great deal of attention from 
policymakers and the press around the world. The United States, for example, has 
been a strong advocate for a more flexible exchange rate system in China. European 
policymakers, fearful that Europe may have to bear a disproportionately large share of 
the adjustment of the US external position, obviously have a keen interest in this 
debate. So far, the response of euro-area policymakers has been to make the sensible 
suggestion that other countries, whose bilateral dollar and effective exchange rates 
have not appreciated over the past few years, and in many cases have depreciated in 
effective terms, should allow their currencies to adjust.  
Since adjustment will involve depreciation in the US real effective exchange 
rate, the question arises: To what extent will governments in Asia allow their 
                                                 
8 See Honohan and Lane (2004) for a discussion of how exchange rate movements affect inflation 
divergences within the euro area. 
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regime. China in particular has pegged its currency firmly to the US dollar for many 
years. In July 2005, the renminbi was allowed to appreciate about 2 per cent, and has 
been stable since. China’s government announced that, in the future, it would peg to a 
basket of currencies, but the exact composition of this basket remains unspecified. 
Future adjustments in China’s exchange rate policy have two dimensions that are 
relevant for Europe. One is the level of the exchange rate. The more the renminbi is 
allowed to appreciate against the dollar, the larger the part of the US current account 
adjustment that falls on the trade flows between China and the US, and the less need 
there is for adjustment between the US and Europe.  
The other dimension is the exchange rate regime. The more the Chinese peg 
shifts from the dollar to the euro, the more China will become a net buyer of euro 
assets. This is likely to result in a euro area current account deficit vis-à-vis China, 
and an appreciation of the euro’s real exchange rate, thereby weakening euro area 
exports. Europe therefore has a clear interest in a significant appreciation of the 
renminbi against the dollar, but not in an increase in the euro’s share in the currency 
basket to which the Chinese peg their currency. 
From a European perspective, a key consideration revolves around what might 
happen to the foreign exchange value of the euro versus the dollar should China move 
to a floating exchange rate regime, as some observers are advocating. On the one hand, 
if China’s moves to a floating system, Chinese demand for dollar assets will drop, 
eliminating a major source of demand for dollars. As a result, the dollar might be 
expected to drop against the euro. On the other hand, to the extent that the renminbi 
appreciates against the dollar under a Chinese float (as most observers would expect), 
  16then the euro may not have to play as large a role in bringing about the necessary drop 
in the real effective dollar to close the US trade deficit.  
 
4. The response of European institutions 
A crucial question for Europe revolves around the ability of European 
institutions to cope effectively with an exchange rate shock. Whether or not these 
institutions can deliver in the face of a sharp exchange rate adjustment obviously 
matters enormously for Europe, but it also has important implications for Asia: If EU 
institutions do not deliver, Europe’s responses could be more erratic, with an 
increased risk of a more protectionist response. In this section, we briefly discuss the 
role that EU institutions will play during global current account adjustment and 
outline the main open questions concerning the likely effectiveness of the current 
arrangements in Europe.   
If a sharp adjustment in exchange rates were to occur that threatened to result 
in deflationary pressures in the euro area, the ECB would be expected to loosen 
monetary policy promptly and aggressively. One issue is the extent to which a rise in 
the value of the euro passes through into imported prices. If exporting firms price-to-
market, then an appreciation of the euro will squeeze the profit margins (after being 
converted into euros) of European firms exporting to the US, but the (euro) price of 
imports from the US will not the affected. As a result, the dampening effect on 
inflation of lower import prices will be absent, possibly ruling out aggressive ECB 
actions.
9  
Moreover, the experience in 2001 when the ECB showed a pretty subdued 
reaction to the risk of deflation, at least compared with the Federal Reserve, raises 
                                                 
9 Estimates of pass-through in the euro area are provided in Faruqee (2004), Warmedinger (2004), and 
Brissimis and Kosma (2005). 
  17questions about how quickly and forcefully the ECB would respond to a large 
exchange rate shock. For example, by the time of the first ECB interest rate cut in 
mid-2001, at which time the policy rate was trimmed 25 basis points to 4½ percent, 
the Federal Reserve had already carried out 250 basis points of easing. As a result, in 
mid-2001 real interest rates in the euro area, at about 2 per cent, were almost double 
the level in the US.
10  
National governments would also play a part in responding to adjustment.  A 
fiscal expansion in Europe can mitigate the effects of the decline in aggregate demand 
resulting from the US current account adjustment. Ahearne and von Hagen (2005) 
recommend that to facilitate this response without endangering the sustainability of 
public finances in the EU countries, governments should move their budgets to 
balance or small surpluses now.  An additional benefit of these sound policies would 
be to make European assets more attractive to Asian investors. But the story here is 
more complicated. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) might hinder a sufficiently 
strong fiscal reaction, especially one that would be forward-looking in the sense of 
acting quickly when the dollar declines fast. Furthermore, if the ensuing recession is 
asymmetric across countries within the euro area, there may be more tension in the 
European Council between the countries strongly affected that desire a large fiscal 
response and those less affected that will insist on staying within the SGB limits. 
Some commentators have argued that the European Commission might be slow to 
provide the leadership necessary in such situations. Again, this may result in delayed 
responses. 
                                                 
10 ECB President Trichet recently offered a different point of view, arguing that central bank “activism” 
cannot be quantified by simple statistics such as the frequency and size of policy moves, and that the 
“ECB’s strategy is as active as it needs to be to fulfil our mandate.” (Trichet, 2006) 
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appreciation in the euro would be intervention in the foreign exchange market.
11  
According to EMU Treaty, responsibility for exchange rate policy is divided between 
the Council of Ministers and the ECB.
12 The Council chooses the exchange rate 
regime under certain provisions (see the footnote below) and subsequently the 
national central banks in the euro area carry out the interventions. Since a formal 
agreement to peg the euro to the dollar is unlikely, this division of responsibilities is 
not of major relevance. That said, the Treaty does give the Council power to 
“formulate general orientations for exchange rate policy.”
13 It is unclear at this stage 
how the Council might use this power in the event of an excessive exchange rate 
shock. 
Although the ECB decides on all details of intervention, in the only episode of 
ECB intervention to date--the intervention in 2000 to support the euro--the ECB chose 
to consult with the Eurogroup of euro-area finance ministers. ECB officials stressed at 
the time, however, that the ECB does not need finance ministers’ permission to 
intervene in foreign exchange markets.
14  Henning (2006) argues that intervention is 
unlikely to be successful if finance ministers were to publicly oppose it. However, in 
the case of global adjustment, the situation is likely to be the opposite from what it 
                                                 
11 Henning (2006) provides an interesting account of the European intervention in the foreign exchange 
market to support the euro in the autumn of 2000. Howarth and Loedel (2003) also discuss the 
institutional arrangements relevant for foreign exchange intervention in the euro area. 
12 Article 111, paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Amsterdam states that “By way of derogation from Article 
300, the Council may, acting unanimously on a recommendation from the ECB or from the 
Commission, and after consulting the ECB in an endeavour to reach a consensus consistent with the 
objective of price stability, after consulting the European Parliament, in accordance with the procedure 
in paragraph 3 for determining the arrangements, conclude formal agreements on an exchange rate 
system for the ECU in relation to non-Community currencies.  
13 Article 111, paragraph 2, states that “In the absence of an exchange rate system in relation to one or 
more non-Community currencies as referred to in paragraph 1, the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority either on a recommendation from the Commission and after consulting the ECB or on a 
recommendation from the ECB, may formulate general orientations for exchange rate policy in relation 
to these currencies. These general orientations shall be without prejudice to the primary objective of the 
ESCB to maintain price stability.” 
14 See, for example, ECB President Duisenberg’s comments reported in The Financial Times, “Careful 
planning behind banks' euro surprise,” 24 September 2000. 
  19was in 2000: The finance ministers may want intervention (to stem the appreciation of 
the euro) but the central bankers may be opposed.  
The relationship between European institutions and the effectiveness of 
arrangements in the euro area also comes into focus in the context of the new IMF 
multilateral consultations on global imbalances. The consultations began in summer 
2006 (initially on a bilateral basis with IMF staff) and involve China, the euro area, 
Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Reportedly, the euro area’s representation 
consists of the Eurogroup, the ECB, and the European Commission.  Munchau (2006) 
argues that recent squabbling between ECB president Trichet and Eurogroup 
president Juncker augurs badly for effective coordination between European 
policymakers. More generally, Berès (2005) argues that there was no “sign of 
solidarity” in the euro area when the euro appreciated markedly vis-à-vis the dollar in 
2003. 
 
5. European attitudes and policies vis-à-vis Asia 
The large US current account deficit and large Chinese current account surplus 
raises a question about what is driving this China-US imbalance. One view puts the 
blame on US excess demand while another view points to excess savings in China. 
Depending on which one it is, reducing that imbalance has different consequences for 
relations between China and the euro area.  
The “capital-flows” or “global saving-glut” view of global imbalances points 
to the high (and growing) level of national savings abroad, especially in Asia, as the 
factor responsible for the large (and growing) US trade deficit.
15 This raises the 
                                                 
15 See Bernanke (2005). 
  20question as to why national savings are so high in Asia. There appear to be several 
reasons. 
For starters, Asian countries seem hungry for dollar assets as they desire to 
rebuild - and even expand beyond - the net foreign asset positions they enjoyed before 
the financial crises of the late 1990s, in order to protect themselves against future 
financial turbulences and dependence on IMF support. 
Additionally, reserves are being accumulated in the context of foreign 
exchange interventions intended to promote export-led growth by preventing 
exchange-rate appreciation.
16  
Furthermore, these countries face growing demographic problems. Given the 
absence of well-developed social security systems in most Asian countries except 
Japan, they may want to accumulate net foreign assets as a source of income for their 
rapidly ageing populations. If this is the case, the US is just supplying the assets that 
Asians want, and this arrangement could go on for some time with no need for an 
immediate, sharp adjustment. Eventually, however, the “capital flows” view suggests 
that the US capital account will have to balance and the current account with it.  
Importantly, Europe’s demographic problems are of the same kind as Asia’s, 
though Europe has a bit more time to reach the peak in the old-age dependency ratio. 
This suggests that from the point of view of Asian investors, Europe is not a good 
region from which to buy assets. Hence, if the Asian-US imbalance goes away, a 
similar imbalance is unlikely to emerge between Europe and Asia.  
The “excess-savings-in-Asia” view implies a different picture. If Asian 
savings are high for reasons other than ageing, a closing of the US current account 
deficit would imply a widening of Europe’s current account deficit.  
                                                 
16 Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) present a controversial version of this rational for 
reserve accumulation in Asia. 
  21An adjustment process that involves a large and sustained increase in the 
euro’s share in Asian reserves would enhance the euro’s status as an international 
reserve currency. How are the prospects of such a development viewed in Europe? On 
the one hand, Europe can earn seignorage revenue and increased capital inflows 
should boost asset prices and lower long–term European interest rates. On the other 
hand, reserve currency status may result in higher volatility of the euro, which in the 
past the Bundesbank has been reluctant to accept.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In today’s highly integrated world economy, every region is likely to be 
affected by the inevitable unwinding of global current account imbalances. As 
discussed in Ahearne and von Hagen (2005), Europe should prepare for global current 
account adjustment by adopting a policy of risk management. The domestic 
macroeconomic consequences of adjustment will be less severe if policies aimed at 
creating more flexible markets are introduced, especially in the services sector. Fiscal 
policy can cushion some of the shock to aggregate demand that will accompany 
adjustment. To facilitate this, European governments should now be striving to 
improve fiscal positions. Finally, the ECB should make it clear that it would respond 
to deflationary pressures by easing monetary policy significantly, thus avoiding the 
risk of deflationary expectations that might raise the cost of adjustment even further. 
The policies above should help to position Europe to better withstand the 
effects of global adjustment. Ultimately, of course, the burden of adjustment that 
Europe will have to bear will depend on decisions made in foreign countries, 
especially in Asia.  
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Table 1. Current Account Balances ($bn) 
   1995  2002  2005 
United States  -114  -472  -791 
UK  -14  -25  -58 
Euro area  44  54  -35 
Asia  72  240  405 
    Japan  111  113  164 
    China  2  35  159 
    Korea  -9  5  17 
Major Oil Exporters*  11  91  374 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Includes Iran, Qatar, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, UAE, Nigeria, Venezuela, 
 Norway and Russia 
          Source: BEA, IMF and OECD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Table 2. 2005 Bilateral Trade Balance ($bn)* 
   EU15  China  Japan  Major Oil Exporters 
United States  -96 -202 -83  -109 
EU15   -128  -45  -135 
China**     -6  -3 
Japan       -84 
Major Oil Exporters         
*A negative figure means that the region in the left-hand column ran a deficit with the region in the row. 
                 **includes Hong Kong 
                 Source: IMF 
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Source: BEA 
 
 
Table 3. Composition of US capital flows (1999-2005) ($bn) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Current Account Balance  -299.8 -415.2 -389.0 -472.4 -527.5  -665.3  -791.5
Capital Account Balance  -4.9 -1.0 -1.3 -1.5 -3.3 -2.3 -4.4
Financial Account Balance  257.6 454.5 342.7 457.3 460.7  609.2  799.6
  Official capital, net 
       
    Foreign official assets in the U.S. 
     U.S. official reserve assets 
     Other U.S. government assets 
 
55.0
43.5
8.7
2.8
41.5
42.8
-0.3
-0.9
22.7
28.1
-4.9
-0.5
112.6
115.9
-3.7
0.3
280.3 
 
 
 
 
278.3 
1.5 
0.5 
392.3 
 
387.8 
2.8 
1.7 
219.1
199.5
14.1
5.5
  Private capital, net  202.6 413.0 320.0 344.7 180.3  216.9  580.4
     Net banking inflows  
-16.5 -16.4 -17.3 58.2 84.2 -24.9 -33.2
     Securities transactions, net 
       
132.1 262.0 288.9 335.1 165.4 337.9 493.5
         Foreign net purchases (+) of U.S. securities 
254.3 389.9 379.5 383.7 312.2 484.4 673.6
                 Treasury securities  -44.5 -70.0 -14.4 100.4 91.5 102.9 199.5
                 Agency bonds  43.1 101.0 82.8 81.8 -36.8 67.4 72.4
                 Corporate and other bonds  142.8 166.4 191.6 145.4 223.2 254.6 316.0
                 Corporate stocks  112.9 192.5 119.5 56.1 34.3 59.5 85.8
          
         U.S. net purchases (-) of foreign securities  -122.2 -127.9 -90.6 -48.6
 
-146.7 
 
-146.5 -180.1
                 Bonds -7.9 -21.2 18.5 -31.6 -28.7 -61.8 -38.0
                 Stocks -114.3 -106.7 -109.1 -17.0 -118.0 -84.8  -142.1
     Direct investment, net  64.5 162.1 24.7 -70.1 -85.9 -111.0  100.7
          Foreign direct investment in the U.S.  289.4 321.3 167.0 84.4 64.0 133.2 109.8
          U.S. direct investment  abroad  -224.9 -159.2 -142.3 -154.5 -149.9 -244.1  -9.1
      Foreign holdings of U.S. currency  22.4 5.3 23.8 21.5 16.6 14.8 19.4
Statistical discrepancy  68.6 -70.2 -10.0 -29.3 -7.5 85.1 10.4
  26 
Table 4. Foreign purchases of U.S. Treasury securities (1999-2005) ($bn) 
   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005
U.S. Treasury bonds and notes, excl. 
transactions of foreign official agencies  -24.7 -65.3 -23.2 78.4 91.0 83.4  215.4
  Net purchases by foreigners, by area:    
    Europe  -41.0 -54.9 -30.2 38.7 18.1  38.2  68.4
    Canada  7.8 2.1 0.2 -5.0 11.4  16.3  21.8
    Caribbean financial centers  -12.8 -5.1 1.0 14.8 6.2  22.1  64.2
    Latin America, excl. CAR financial centers  2.6 -1.2 -3.3 3.1 3.0  -3.4  10.5
    Asia  17.8 -7.2 8.1 22.3 46.4  10.4  46.1
    Africa  -0.4 -0.1 0.1 1.1 -0.2  0.7  2.0
Source: BEA  
 
    Other  1.3 1.1 1.0 3.6 6.1  -0.8  2.5
 
 
Source: BEA  
 
Table 5. Composition of US capital flows with EU (1999-2005) ($bn) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
U.S.-owned assets abroad, net 
(increase/financial outflow (-)) 
-273.1 -312.2 -196.0 -131.2 -223.5 -432.6 -137.2
U.S. private assets, net 
Of which: 
-271.1 -311.5 -195.7 -131.1 -223.7 -432.7 -137.9
     U.S. direct investment abroad -97.8 -70.6 -57.8 -70.0 -70.5  -86.5  28.6
     U.S. purchase of EU securities -54.4 -88.8 -51.5 -33.3 -57.0  -118.5  -68.6
EU-owned assets in the U.S. 
net (increase/financial inflow (+)) 
Of which: 
408.8 593.0 361.9 214.6 244.5 461.0 455.1
    EU direct investment in U.S.  220.3 236.7 60.0 34.4 30.4 58.3 65.0
    EU purchases of U.S. Treasuries        -41.0 -54.9 -30.2 38.7 18.1 38.2 68.4
    EU purchases of non-U.S. Treasuries  188.4 314.1 212.7 102.7 106.5 153.8 219.6
Statistical discrepancy  -95.6 -226.8 -112.7 -4.1 68.0 78.9  -175.9
Balance on current account  -39.8 -53.8 -53.0 -79.0 -88.7  -107.0  -141.5
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Table 6. European purchases of  U.S. securities other than U.S. Treasury securities ($bn) 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Stocks, net purchases                      
      Europe  92.0 181.6 86.8 31.5 22.1  35.3  43.2
        Of which: United Kingdom  40.6 71.8 37.3 14.4 0.2  28.9  23.6
Corporate bonds, net purchases                 
      Europe  96.1 111.7 108.4 78.9 130.9  126.3  200.9
        Of which: United Kingdom  77.1 95.2 84.1 55.8 89.0  69.6  140.2
Agency  bonds               
      Europe  9.4 36.8 29.6 4.7 -29.4  13.3  -11.9
        Of which: United Kingdom  5.0 28.5 33.4 22.4 14.6  31.4  -3.8
Source: BEA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. U.S. Investment: Net Income and Stocks vis-a-vis EU* ($bn) 
   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
A. Net Income  -13.4 -8.6 -3.1 -7.4 -0.8  -7.8 -25.5
Of which:        
      Direct investment net 15.9 21.0 32.2 32.4 27.9  24.8 13.3
Receipts       
  Income receipts  111.2 134.3 111.0 104.5 118.5  142.9 182.3
Of which:        
      Direct investment receipts 50.4 57.9 44.7 51.5 70.1  81.5 89.5
Payments       
  Income payments  -124.5 -142.9 -114.2 -111.8 -119.3  -150.7 -207.8
Of which:        
      Direct investment payments -34.5 -36.8 -12.5 -19.1 -42.1  -56.7 -76.2
         
B. Net Stocks  --- --- --- ---. -18.0 -289.1 n.a. 
Portfolio holdings, net**  --- --- --- ---. -108.6 -315.1 n.a. 
  US holdings of EU securities  n.a. n.a. 1186.9 n.a. 1542.0  1790.4 n.a. 
  EU holdings of US securities  n.a. 1351.0 n.a. 1430.7 1650.5  2105.5 n.a. 
Direct Investment, net***  -21.4 -163.8 -105.1 0.6 90.5  26.0 n.a. 
  US Direct Investment in EU 676.8 731.6 821.0 909.8 1035.1  1061.8 n.a. 
  EU Direct Investment in U.S. 698.3 895.4 926.1 909.2 944.6  1035.8 n.a. 
  *EU15 up to 2004, EU25 in 2004 and 2005 
** market value 
*** current cost 
Source: BEA, TIC and own estimates        
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Table 8. Foreign holdings of dollar assets ($bn)     
     2000 2002 2004  
 
1,845 2,237 2,961 Euro area   
 
1,219 1,567 2,421 Asia*   
 
750 940 1,373       Japan   
 
 
 
172 270 434       China 
      
       105 165 Major Oil Exporters*  267
   *Norway, Venezuela, Algeria, Gabon, Nigeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, 
Russia 
   Source: BEA and US Treasury 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.  Euro area trade with China and US, 1998 and 2005 (per cent of GDP) 
   Exports to  Imports from 
   China  US  China  US 
    1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998  2005 
Austria     0.3  0.8  1.2 2.4 0.4 0.9 1.1  0.9 
Belgium  0.7 1.4 3.5 5.4 1.1 3.6 4.9  4.4 
Germany    0.5  1.1  2.3 3.1 0.6 1.6 1.4  1.4 
Spain     0.2  0.2  0.8 0.7 0.5 1.1 1.1  0.7 
Finland     1.4  1.2  2.5  2.1  0.5  1.3  1.6  1.1 
France     0.5  0.5  1.7  1.6  0.4  0.9  1.6  1.2 
Greece     0.1  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.5  1.0  1.1  0.8 
Ireland     0.5  1.0  9.7  10.3  0.8  1.1  7.9  4.7 
Italy     0.4  0.5  1.7  1.7  0.4  1.0  0.9  0.8 
Netherlands     0.4  0.7  2.0  2.8  1.9  5.6  4.7  4.5 
Portugal     0.1  0.2  1.0 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.9  0.7 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 4:
Cumulated Current Accounts
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